The old meme, that there’s nothing wrong with being gay, can be interpreted in at least two different ways, functional and moral. In this article I argue that homosexuality is functionally abnormal, based on the functionalist description of sexuality, but not morally wrong.
For purposes of the present analysis I define homosexuality as the dominant sexual-attraction to members of the same-sex. American Psychological Association maintains that “same-sex sexual attractions, behavior, and orientations (…) do not indicate either mental or developmental disorders.” In this context, homosexuality is regarded as a normal variation of human sexuality, free of “impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities” (AMA), and does not require any medical intervention. The adjective ‘normal’ is further qualified as intended to denote “presence of a positive and healthy outcome of human development”. I call the scope of normality which is limited to a specific domain the narrow-scope (relative) normality, in contrast to absolute normality which is true for all possible domains of rational discourse.
There is a strong tendency in the social sciences to extrapolate the medical judgment of the narrow-scope normality to all domains of rational discourse, in effect regarding homosexual orientation as normal in the wide-scope sense. This additional analytical step can be defended in several ways: from statistical regularity (population norm), from nature (natural norm), from sexual modality (modal norm), and from sexual identity (normal for some). I will show that all of these analytical strategies fail to satisfy the formal criteria of normativity. While this failure does not of itself entail abnormality, I will engage a functionalist account of sexuality to unequivocally demonstrate that homosexual orientation entails a narrow-scope, non-pathological abnormality. I will further show that in order to defend the much stronger claim that homosexuality is morally wrong would require demonstrating that homosexuality is (at least in some cases) subject to choice, and there are objective, belief-independent moral norms about sexual attraction. I conclude that satisfaction of this second tier of normative evaluation presents an impossible evidential burden and must be rejected.
The argument from statistical regularity relies on the evidence of stable demographic distribution of same-sex attracted individuals over time, suggesting that it is normal for the human population to include a certain proportion of homosexual individuals. I contend that the population norm does not entail individual normality because establishing a norm requires more than just the evidence of regular occurrence in the population; crippling genetic abnormalities or mental disorders can also have regular distribution but that does not render those states normal. The related argument that homosexuality is normal because it is natural (people are born that way) faces a similar objection: just because some medical condition is natural and inborn does not make it healthy, let alone normal. For example, some people are born with eleven fingers but that does not mean that having eleven fingers is a normal state of human physiology. In any case, the question is not whether it is normal or natural for the population to include some gay people, but whether it is normal for an individual to be gay, and the arguments from statistical regularity and from nature do not answer this question.
The next argument, from sexual modality, maintains that homosexuality, heterosexuality and bisexuality are just modes of healthy sexuality and are therefore normal. The modal argument begs the question why should the alleged mode itself be regarded as normal, and if modality is taken to entail normality then it again begs the question why must we regard these different orientations as modes of the normal rather than one as being normal and the others abnormal. The modal argument could be just as well applied to the eleven digits scenario: if having eleven fingers is normal because it is a mode of normal human physiology then the conclusion relies on the presupposition that normal human physiology consists of these two modes, but this is something that must also be demonstrated. Using the modal approach in such an ungrounded way could effectively eradicate all abnormality by simply defining it out of existence, but this would also negate the sense of normality and thus result in contradiction. This refutation could be challenged by making a comparison to left-handedness and right-handedness as normal modes of being two-handed, what seems intuitively right, and asking why should sexual orientation be regarded as modally different to handedness. In response to this challenge I would object that is the case of handedness we infer modality from the intuitive normality, but that does nothing to demonstrate that, in case of sexual orientation, normality can be inferred from the assumption of modality. It would still have to be shown that sexual orientation is objectively modal and that modality entails normality. A further evidential burden for sustaining this kind of challenge would be to show that the kind of modal description that entails normality would override the (forthcoming) practical description that entails functional abnormality.
The final argument in defence of the wide-scope normality is the argument from identity, which maintains that it is just normal for gay people to be gay. This argument can be generalised with the formula ‘it is normal for something X to be X’. Now, let X take the value ‘abnormal’. Substitution for X results in the expression ‘it is normal for something abnormal to be abnormal’ which is evidently unsatisfactory: a norm that applies to X cannot be logically satisfied by X just being itself. This objection reflects a formal criterion of normativity and is virtually unassailable; in essence, “There is no normativity if you cannot be wrong.” (Lavin, Douglas. Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error. Ethics, 2004.) In any case, the question is not whether it is normal for someone gay to be gay, but whether just being gay is normal, and the argument from identity does not answer this question.
I will now revisit the functionalist account of sexuality presented in my earlier article (A Functionalist Defence of Binary Gender) and show why homosexuality is functionally abnormal. The present argument differs in an important way from Michael Levin’s Why Homosexuality is Abnormal (The Monist, 1984) in that I focus on deficiency of the sexual function rather than just on the functionally abnormal use of body parts. Abnormal use does not negate the capacity for normal use when normal use is required and therefore does not of itself entail a constitutive abnormality.
Sexuality is analysable as a set of complementary functions with a common constitutive aim without which sexuality would just not make sense: procreation. If this aim is existentially indispensable and there is no evidence of other constitutive aims to sex that are also existentially indispensable, then any practically relevant definition of sexual normality must include the functional capacity to satisfy this aim. On this view, Male is a functional kind characterised by the hypothetical capacity to produce sperm, and Female is a functional kind characterised by the hypothetical capacity to produce eggs. By ‘hypothetical’ I mean the capacity that could be realised in one’s lifetime under conditions of anatomical completeness, sexual maturity and the optimal state of health. The sexual function is nonetheless not exhausted by males just producing sperm and by females just producing eggs; there is also a performative dimension to sexuality that involves, relevantly, sexual orientation. Heterosexual orientation spontaneously regulates the ‘right’ choice of sexual partners for the aim of reproduction to be possible, consisting in attraction to members of the opposite sex and a degree of repulsion from sexual acts with members of the same sex. Homosexual orientation, on the other hand, is essentially at odds with the constitutive aim of sexuality and is therefore ‘wrong’ in light of that aim. If this is correct, then heterosexuality must be regarded as the constitutive norm of sexuality, while homosexuality, being a deficiency or an impediment to realisation of the constitutive aim, must be regarded as functionally abnormal. There may be other functional desiderata that favour heterosexuality, for example, the capacity for long-term romantic bond between male and female partners may be casually linked to enduring parental love, long-term care and optimal psychological development of the offspring, but for the sake of the present argument procreation should suffice.
Functional abnormality is narrow-scope; it does not apply outside of the relevant functionalist account nor does it entail pathology, but is nonetheless practically significant. It justifies, for example, functionally normal females discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation of males when seeking a partner with whom to procreate and found a family. Furthermore, if heterosexuality is not just attraction to the opposite sex but also a degree of sexual repulsion from members of the same sex, then stigmatisation of moderately-negative attitudes to public displays of homosexual acts as ‘homophobia’ may be unjustified and discriminatory. I am not sure if this is necessarily the case, but it is an area where normal heterosexual responses may have been mischaracterised.
There is one serious objections to the above account of homosexuality. It may be argued that if homosexuality poses an impediment to reliable procreation then the same accusation could be leveled at unattractive appearance, poor dress-sense, bad habits, irritability etc. All these characteristics may also be an impediment to reliably attracting partners of the opposite sex. That is intuitively true, but there is no objective standard for determining what constitutes unattractive appearance, poor dress-sense, bad habits, or whether irritability is always unattractive. The judgement about attractiveness, compatibility or value seems to be highly subjective and irregular from one individual to another. Someone may appear to be grossly failing on all the above counts but a person of the opposite sex may share similarly ‘negative’ qualities and thus consider those attributes desirable, both partners in effect validating one another’s condition. The range of these characteristics observable in one sex is always reflected by a similar range of characteristics in the opposite sex, and being considered unattractive by someone is no impediment to founding a family with someone else. Sexual orientation, on the other hand, does not share this kind of compatibility in the opposite sex: homosexual men do not find homosexual women more attractive than heterosexual women.
Another way of challenging the narrow-scope abnormality of homosexual orientation would be to reject the functionalist account altogether, but I do not see how this approach could succeed given the obvious existential implications of sexuality, which are distinctly functional. Even if other accounts could better explain sexuality it would still have to be shown that the functionalist account is wrong.
Finally, I want to address the question of morality of sexual orientation. Moral norms regulate intentional action and as such do not apply if the agent has no choice about how to feel or how to act. On this account, if homosexuality is an involuntary variation of the sexual orientation then the moral criterion does not apply. If, on the other hand, homosexuality is in some cases a result of individual choices, then it still remains to be shown that those specific choices are objectively morally wrong. Since no philosopher has as yet made a good case for the existence of objective moral truths (that is, moral facts that are true irrespective of personal beliefs) prudence demands accepting that such hypothetical choices are not morally wrong.
In conclusion, the claim that there’s nothing wrong with being gay is not absolutely true. There is something wrong with homosexuality, but this ‘wrongness’ is neither moral nor pathological but just the ‘narrow-scope’ abnormality of a particular existential function of the human species. It does not justify discrimination in any context other than when selecting for a partner with the aim of procreating and establishing a family and, perhaps, in explaining moderately-negative attitudes to public displays of gay sex. This is important in light of the original claim of normality being overstated in social sciences and in the popular discourse. Social policy based on erroneous conception of normality can be harmful.
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Nice article. Good arguments.